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ESSAY
THE INCOHERENCE OF
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
NONDISCRIMINATION:
A REJOINDER TO PROFESSOR DENNING
Edward A. Zelinsky*
INTRODUCTION

A sound intuition animates Professor Denning's defense of
the doctrinal status quo under the dormant commerce clause:
the courts should not lightly abandon well-established constitutional canons. I nevertheless remain unconvinced by Professor
Denning's effort to justify the long-standing interpretation of
the dormant commerce clause as forbidding taxes which discriminate against interstate commerce. Whatever the historical
justification for this constitutional precept, its past utility, or its
visceral appeal, dormant commerce clause nondiscrimination is
today doctrinally incoherent in tax contexts. The problem is not
one of borderlines and close cases. Rather, at its core, the notion of dormant commerce clause tax nondiscrimination currently rests on two untenable distinctions: the distinction between tax incentives and direct expenditures and the distinction
between tax provisions which are deemed discriminatory and
those which are not. For two reasons, neither of these distinctions is today workable or persuasive.
First, any tax incentive can be transformed into an economically and procedurally equivalent direct spending program.
Consider, for example, Hawaii's tax exemption for certain lo-

• Edward A. Zelinsky is the Morris and Annie Trachman Professor of Law of the
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University. For comments on drafts of
this article, Professor Zelinsky thanks Aaron S.J. Zelinsky of the Yale Law School Class
of 2010.

653

654

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 77

cally-produced beverages, a tax exemption invalidated by the
United States Supreme Court under the dormant commerce
clause as discriminating against interstate commerce. 1 In lieu
of such tax subvention, the Hawaii legislature can instead subsidize its local industry by means of direct grants, low interest
loans, public infrastructure such as roads and sewers, and governmental services such as job training. The Court has declared
that dormant commerce clause nondiscrimination focuses upon
the "actual effect" of challenged state tax policies. 2 Unless the
Court is prepared to declare that the Commerce Clause forbids
equivalent non-tax forms of subvention (including routine state
and local activities), Hawaii can achieve with direct spending
programs the same subsidizing effect as was previously
achieved by the now-forbidden tax exemption.
Second, no convincing line can be drawn between those tax
provisions which are to be deemed discriminatory and those
which pass dormant commerce clause muster. Besides "actual
effect," the Court's other lodestar in dormant commerce clause
cases has been "economic protectionism-that is, regulatory
measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by
burdening out-of-state competitors." 3 However, in this context,
the notion of "economic protectionism" is overly broad: any tax
reduction (or public service) benefits in-state taxpayers to the
exclusion of non-residents. If, for example, a state lowers its
general tax rates (or improves its public schools), the state
thereby favors in-state economic interests and actors over businesses and persons located outside the state. Few, if any, would
openly declare that general tax rate reductions discriminate for
dormant commerce clause purposes though, like the more targeted tax deductions and credits the Court has stricken, general
rate reductions benefit those within the state by lowering their
tax burdens. There is no principled distinction between the
"economic protectionism" inherent in such general tax reductions (and similar programs) and the protectionism implicit in
the narrower tax incentives which the Court has invalidated as
1

2
3

Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 263 (1984) .
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 281 (1977).
New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988).
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discriminating under the dormant commerce clause. Both tilt
the economic playing field by bestowing largesse upon in-state
interests, thereby encouraging firms and residents currently in
the state to remain and attracting to the state businesses and
firms currently outside. There is no persuasive reason to condemn on constitutional grounds some tax reductions as discriminating against interstate commerce while sparing others.
The upshot today is that an arbitrary subset of government
policies and programs, i.e., certain, ill-defined tax provisions,
are declared unconstitutionally discriminatory under the dormant commerce clause while other taxes and direct spending
programs are not, even though these other taxes and programs
are procedurally and economically equivalent to the taxes invalidated on constitutional grounds and, in protectionist fashion, favor in-state residents and actors just like the taxes abrogated as discriminatory. 4
Professor Denning himself characterizes dormant commerce
clause nondiscrimination as an "ill-defined and undertheorized"5 concept. Professor Denning thereby suggests that
the dormant commerce clause notion of nondiscrimination will
eventually be rendered coherent with additional attention and
effort.
I respectfully disagree. Many fine scholars, including Professor Denning himself, have worked energetically and skillfully
to rationalize the concept of dormant commerce clause nondiscrimination.6 The failure of these efforts reflects not a lack of
effort, but the intractability of the problem: any tax subsidy can
be transformed into a procedurally and economically equivalent
direct expenditure. There is thus no point in proscribing constitutionally tax subsidies unless the same scrutiny is given to
4
See Edward A. Zelinsky, Davis v. Department of Revenue: The Incoherence of
Dormant Commerce Clause Nondiscrimination, 44 STATE TAX NOTES 947 (2007) [here•
inafter Zelinsky, Davis].
5 Brannon P. Denning, Is the Dormant Commerce Clause Expendable? A Response
to Edward Zelinsky, 77 MISS . L.J. 623, 651 (2007).
6 See Zelinsky, Davis, supra note 4, at 944-45. See also Edward A. Zelinsky, Restoring Politics to the Commerce Clause: The Case for Abandoning the Dormant Commerce
Clause Prohibition on Discriminatory Taxation , 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 29, 47-76 (2002)
(explaining in more detail) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Restoring Politics to the Commerce
Clause].
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homologous direct expenditures, including routine state and
local outlays. Since most of us recoil from extending so far the
dormant commerce clause doctrine of nondiscrimination, we are
left with a doctrine which purports to be about "actual effect"
but which arbitrarily condemns some policies as discriminating
against interstate commerce, i.e., certain tax policies, while condoning others, i.e., economically and procedurally equivalent
direct expenditures and tax reductions.
Moreover, the intuitively appealing admonition for states to
avoid protectionism ultimately proves hollow since all state activity favors in-state residents and firms to the exclusion of nonresidents. Benefiting their residents is what states do. There is
no compelling reason to characterize some policies and programs assisting in-state firms and individuals as "protectionist"
discrimination against interstate comi:µerce while deeming
other activities which favor in-state persons and interests as
nondiscriminatory and thus acceptable for dormant commerce
clause purposes.
Abolishing the dormant commerce clause principle of nondiscrimination will not eliminate the complaints of those who
believe themselves to be the victims of discriminatory taxation
by the states. Rather, such abolition will shift taxpayers' complaints from the courts to Congress (which has ultimate constitutional authority over interstate commerce) and to the state
legislatures (which enact the tax laws in question).
PROFESSOR DENNING'S DEFENSE OF
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE NONDISCRIMINATION

In response, Professor Denning mounts a four-part defense
of the doctrinal status quo. He first faults my critique of dormant commerce clause nondiscrimination for its "false modesty."7 He further invokes the concept of framing effects to defend for dormant commerce clause purposes the distinction between tax incentives and direct expenditures. Third, Professor
Denning argues that I misapply the concept of discrimination by

7

Denning, supra note 5, at 629.
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conflating taxpayers who are not "similarly situated." 8 Finally,
Professor Denning criticizes Congress's performance supervising interstate commerce and state tax laws affecting interstate
commerce. Such "congressional supervision," he concludes, occurs only "where the issue is large enough to garner the attention of Congress." 9 When Congress does intervene, it typically
does not stop "state abuses" but, rather, "facilitat[es] them." 10
None of these four arguments, I suggest, salvages dormant
commerce clause nondiscrimination in tax contexts.
Professor Denning's charge of false modesty has two components. First, Professor Denning argues that the proposal to
abolish dormant commerce clause nondiscrimination in tax settings will "inevitably" lead to the abandonment of the concept of
dormant commerce clause nondiscrimination "in non-tax cases
as well." 11 Second, Professor Denning contends that abandoning
the dormant commerce clause precept of nondiscrimination is
tantamount to abandoning the dormant commerce clause itself
since, without a notion of nondiscrimination vis-a-vis interstate
commerce, the dormant commerce clause "has little reason to
exist" and "little judicially-enforceable content." 12
As to the first of these claims, Professor Denning may well
be right that, once dormant commerce clause nondiscrimination
is discarded in tax contexts, it will be jettisoned in non-tax settings as well. I confess that this possibility does not fill me with
dread. If, upon reflection, dormant commerce clause nondiscrimination proves as incoherent in non-tax cases as it is in tax
settings, the presumption favoring long-standing constitutional
principles will be overcome in those non-tax cases as well. If so,
the litigants who previously challenged particular state spending and regulatory policies as discriminatory will then have the
same legislative remedies as those who formerly litigated their
contentions that particular state taxes discriminate against interstate commerce. Even as the courthouses close to these discrimination-claiming litigants, Congress and the state legislaa Id. at 642.
9 Id. at 651.
10 Id. at 649.
11
Id. at 631.
12 Id. at 635.
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tures will remain open. In the final analysis, the Commerce
Clause is Congress's to enforce.
As to the second of these assertions, I strongly disagree.
There will remain much important content to the dormant
commerce clause even without a test of nondiscrimination. The
dormant commerce clause is today understood as imposing four
requirements on state taxes which affect interstate commerce: 13
such taxes must "not discriminate." 14 Such taxes must be "fairly
apportioned." 15 Such taxes must be imposed on persons "with a
substantial nexus with the taxing State." 16 Finally, state taxes
affecting interstate commerce must be "fairly related to the services provided by the State." 17
There is a strong (and, I think, compelling) consensus that
the last of these tests-that state taxes be "fairly related to the
services" furnished by the taxing state-has in practice evidenced little content. 18 However, the same cannot be said of the
requirements that state taxes must be apportioned and that
such taxes may only be assessed against taxpayers with adequate nexus to the taxing state. It is true that important and
difficult issues arise as to these two tests, as they do in all constitutional settings. There is, for example, much disagreement
today whether nexus requires a taxpayer's physical presence
within the taxing state.19 Moreover, these two tests, again like
all other constitutional precepts, are not self-executing. New
York's courts, for example, have been notoriously resistant to

13 The classic statement of these four requirements is Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 274 (1977).
14 Id . at 279.
15 Id.
16 Id .
17 Id.
18 S ee, e.g., 1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION:

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS AND CORPORATE INCOME AND FRANCHISE TAXES ,r
4.17[2] [E] (3d ed. 1998); Robert D . Plattner, Vantage Point: New York 's "Convenience of
the Employer" Doctrine-A Role for Complete Auto Transit 's Fourth Prong, 2003 STATE
TAX TODAY 129-29 (July 7, 2003).
19 See Tax Comm'r v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. , 640 S.E .2d 226 (W. Va. 2006), cert.
denied, 127 S . Ct. 2997 (2007); Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 908 A.2d 176 (N.J .
2006), cert. denied , 127 S . Ct. 2974 (2007); HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 18,
,r 6.11; 2 RICHARD D. POMP & OLIVER OLDMAN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 11-215 (5th
ed. 2005) .
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apportioning the income of nonresidents on days such nonresidents telecommute from their out-of-state homes. 20
These interpretive issues, the standard grist of the constitutional mill, do not belie the significance of the dormant commerce clause norms of apportionment and nexus. On the contrary, these controversies highlight the importance of these
norms . Abolishing the dormant commerce clause test of nondiscrimination will leave intact the apportionment and nexus requirements under that clause. The dormant commerce clause
will thus remain central to the constitutional jurisprudence of
state and local taxation.
Professor Denning's second major argument for the doctrinal status quo is that taxes and direct expenditures should be
treated differently for dormant commerce clause purposes since
a significant number of individuals succumb to framing effects
and thus fail to appreciate the economic equivalence of tax incentives and direct outlays. To buttress this argument, Professor Denning notes that I have been among those who have
documented the existence of tax-related framing effects: many
individuals (even well-educated individuals) perceive tax incentives as somehow different from economically and procedurally
equivalent tax incentives.21 Professor Denning's second argument is thus a friendly but pointed effort to hoist me on my own
scholarly petard: direct "subsidies are just seen (both as a matter of history and in accord with current practice) as different"
from tax incentives. 22 Consequently, Professor Denning reasons,
[t]o the extent that certain governmental actions (subsidies, for
example) are not perceived by others as imposing a burden on
out-of-state commerce or out-of-state commercial actors, it is
less likely that those actions will stimulate retaliatory re20 See Huckaby v. N.Y. State Div. of Tax Appeals, 829 N.E.2d 276, 276 (2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct . 546; Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 769 N.E.2d 464 (2003), cert.
denied, 541 U.S. 1009 (2004); Edward A. Zelinsky, Employer Con venience, Telecommuting and the Constitution: The Empire State Really Strikes Back , 40 STATE TAX NOTES
451 (2006) . In the interests of full disclosure, I note that I was the telecommuting taxpayer in the Zelinsky litigation .
21 Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing Effects? Volunteer
Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, and The Paradox of Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24
VA. TAX REV. 797 (2005).
22 Denning, supra note 5, at 638.
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sponses aimed at the enacting state, its products, or its citizens.23

Hence, the argument concludes, the courts must preempt
retaliation between the states by superintending state tax policies under the dormant commerce clause. However, the courts
need not police economically comparable direct outlays. These
direct outlays are irrationally but consistently perceived by
many as different from their tax incentive equivalents and are
thus less politically provocative.
Professor Denning does not acknowledge the sweeping nature of this argument which sub silentio recasts the rationale
for the dormant commerce clause nondiscrimination principle
from substantive concern with the economic impact of state
taxes to procedural regard for the states' internal political processes. The Court has stated that dormant commerce clause
nondiscrimination focuses upon the "actual effect" of state tax
policies on interstate commerce. 24 Professor Denning would shift
the focus of the nondiscrimination principle from this substantive concern with the "actual effect" of particular state taxes to
the procedural likelihood of states' "retaliatory responses" to
each others' tax policies.
This is no diffident fine-tuning of existing doctrine, but
rather a fundamental reconstruction of the justification for
dormant commerce clause nondiscrimination. If, as Professor
Denning suggests of my analysis, false modesty is cause for concern, the red flags should be flying at this point in Professor
Denning's argument.

Id. at 641.
The exception to this statement is W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186
(1994). See Zelinsky, Restoring Politics to the Commerce Clause, supra note 6, at 40-42,
64-69.
23

24
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Moreover, 25 what Professor Denning bemoans as retaliation
others would praise as interstate competition. If state A attempts to lure an employer from state B with tax credits and
exemptions, state B might well respond with its own package of
incentives to retain that employer. Many economists 26 and legal
scholars 27 view state B's response in this scenario as constituting not an undesirable riposte, but rather as embodying beneficial interstate competition.
In the alternative, suppose that state C reduces its general
corporate income tax rate to improve its business climate and
that adjoining state D responds by matching that decrease.
Again, rather than denounce D for retaliating against C's tax
rate reductions, many public finance mavens would view D as
legitimately competing in the inter-jurisdictional marketplace.
One need not believe that all forms of interstate tax competition are equally benign28 to be skeptical of Professor Denning's
concept of retaliation and to consequently doubt that the likelihood of retaliation should be the touchstone for dormant commerce clause nondiscrimination.
Finally, if "retaliatory'' state tax policies are perceived as a
significant problem, Congress, exercising its affirmative authority under the Commerce Clause, can legislate to address this
problem. As I will discuss infra, Professor Denning and I disagree as to the comparative advantage of legislative as opposed
25 Some Founders feared that the states would resolve disputes over tax policy by
calling out their respective militias. In Federalist No. 7, Hamilton argued that if the
Constitution were not adopted, New York's duties on imports could lead to armed conflict with Connecticut and New J ersey. THE FEDERALIST No. 7 (Alexander Hamilton).
While Ha milton was right in his time to be concerned about this possibility, few of us
are today. As I know from personal experience, today Connecticut responds to New
York's unfair taxation of Connecticut's residents by litigating and legislating, not by
calling out the National Guard. See, e.g., Brief of Richard Blumenthal, AG of Conn. in
Support of Petitioner, Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 541 U.S. 1009 (2004) (No. 031177); The Telecommuter Tax Fairness Act of 2007, S. 785, 110th Cong. (2007); The
Telecommuter Tax Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 1360, 110th Cong. (2007).
26 See THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY (William A. Fischel ed., 2006).
27 For my own ruminations on this subj ect, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Metropolitanism, Progressivism, and Race, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 665 (1998).
28 I do not. For example, I share, on tax policy grounds, the skepticism of the Cuno
plaintiffs about the kind of target.id tax credits they challenged. I disagree with them
that, as a matter of law, such credits are unconstitutional. Edward A. Zelinsky, Cuno:
The Property Tax Issue , 4 GEO. J. OF L. AND PUB. POL'Y 119 (2006); Edward A. Zelinsky,
Ohio Incentives Decision Revisited, 37 STATE TAX NOTES 859 (2005).
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to judicial decision making under the Commerce Clause. For
now, I simply observe that Congress has ample authority to address any problem vis-a-vis retaliatory state tax policies, assuming such a problem exists.
Professor Denning's third major argument is that I misapply the concept of discrimination by conflating taxpayers who
should be treated separately. Discrimination occurs, he plausibly contends, when distinctions are made among "similarlysituated parties." 29 Since taxpayers located outside any given
state are beyond that state's "taxing jurisdiction," 30 there is no
discrimination when the state reduces its general tax rates to
benefit in-state residents and firms since out-of-state citizens
are not similarly-situated to those in-state.
Under this eminently reasonable approach, every dormant
commerce clause nondiscrimination tax case is wrongly decided:
if in-state firms and residents are dissimilarly situated in the
context of general rate reductions, they must also be dissimilarly situated when more targeted tax benefits are at issue. If
so, the in-state firms benefiting from "discriminatory" tax subsidies are, by virtue of their in-state locations, situated differently
from their out-of-state competitors. The tax subsidies stricken
as "discriminatory'' should instead pass constitutional muster
since the in-state recipients of those subsidies are not situated
similarly to their out-of-state competitors.
Consider, again, Hawaii's tax exemption subsidizing certain
locally-produced beverages, 31 an exemption invalidated by the
United States Supreme Court as discriminating against interstate commerce. In the context of general tax rate reductions,
Professor Denning tells us, out-of-state manufacturers are, by
virtue of their out-of-state locations, not situated similarly to
Hawaii's in-state producers. Hawaii can thus adopt a broad tax
reduction which benefits only in-state firms. If so, Hawaii
should also be able to extend more narrow tax subsidies to particular Hawaii firms since in-state industry is not situated similarly to its out-of-state competitors. In the context of targeted
s Denning, supra note 5 at 642.
Id.
3 1 Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
2

30
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tax benefits also, non-Hawaii firms fall outside the state's tax
jurisdiction and are thus not situated similarly to the in-state
businesses within that jurisdiction. The Bacchus Court was
thus wrong to declare that the dormant commerce clause requires Hawaii's tax laws to treat in-state firms in the same way
as their dissimilarly situated out-of-state competitors.
Likewise, out-of-state goods shipped into Hawaii are, by
virtue of their geographic origin, not similarly situated to products manufactured in-state. Again, the holding of BacchusHawaii discriminates unconstitutionally when it extends tax
subsidies only to locally-produced beverages-proves unpersuasive if, in the context of general rate reductions, products manufactured in-state are not situated similarly to products brought
to Hawaii from out-of-state.
Consider as a second example Ohio's sales tax credit for
ethanol produced in-state, another tax subsidy invalidated by
the Court as discriminating against interstate commerce for
dormant commerce clause purposes. 32 The Court's decision is
correct under Professor Denning's test of similar situation only
if Ohio must treat out-of-state ethanol manufacturers and their
product as situated similarly to Ohio's domestic producers of
ethanol and their Ohio-based output. If so, are not these instate and out-of-state producers and products also situated similarly for purposes of evaluating non-tax subsidies and general
tax reductions? Suppose Ohio benefits a domestic manufacturer
of ethanol by building roads and sewers to the manufacturer's
new plant or by providing job training for its Ohio workforce. If
tax-based assistance limited to this Ohio manufacturer discriminates because this domestic manufacturer is similarly
situated to its out-of-state competitors, the dormant commerce
clause must also proscribe these other forms of assistance, given
to this domestic firm but not to its similarly situated out-ofstate rivals.
In short, Professor Denning's similarly situated test does
not extract us from the doctrinal morass which is dormant
commerce clause tax nondiscrimination. If in-state firms can
receive general tax rate reductions because such firms are dif32

New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988).
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ferently situated from their out-of-state competitors, such instate firms should also be able, by virtue of that geographical
difference, to receive the narrowly targeted tax benefits which
have been stricken by the Court as discriminatory.
Consider, finally, Professor Denning's misgivings about
Congress as the ultimate regulator of interstate commerce. Of
course, the text of the Constitution is explicit: It is the job of
Congress, not the judiciary, "[t]o regulate Commerce ... among
the several States."33
The Framers' decision to assign to Congress the authority
to supervise interstate commerce has a particularly contemporary ring since the national legislature has far greater institutional capacity to supervise a complex modern economy than do
the courts. The courts can, at best, give episodic attention to
specific cases brought to them by litigants. Because they are
limited to particular "Cases ... [and] Controversies,"34 the courts
cannot engage in sustained and continuous oversight. The
courts lack specialized expertise and staff. Taxation is a matter
of balancing the interests of different constituencies and fashioning compromises among competing interests and concerns.
The judiciary is poorly-suited for such political and often arbitrary decision making.
In all these respects, Congress is better positioned than the
courts to exercise final authority over interstate commerce including oversight of the states' tax policies affecting such commerce. Congress has specialized committees and expert staff as
well as the ability to undertake sustained and ongoing superintendence and study. Taxation is an inherently political topic.
Political decision making is best confided to the political branch.
This is not to say that Congress's performance in this, or in
any other area, is ideal. If the relevant comparison is between
the messy realities of congressional decision making and an idealized notion of judicial performance, it is easy to pick a winner.
If, however, we confront the more sober choice between the legislative process as it actually exists and the realities of judicial
decision making under the dormant commerce clause, Congress
33
34

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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emerges as the better forum for resolving disputes about "discriminatory" state tax policies.
Professor Denning indicts Congress for many of the laws it
has enacted under the Commerce Clause. 35 As to some of these
laws, I share Professor Denning's policy preferences. On the
other hand, I confess that I am not alarmed by Congress's approval of state laws favoring resident hunters and fishermen. 36
In any event, my disagreement with some of Congress's
choices under the Commerce Clause does not imply that the
courts are better for resolving issues of interstate commerce and
state tax policy. Indeed, a fundamental paradox arises in Professor Denning's analysis: He dismisses the courts' bad decisions as "wrongheaded" 37 applications of the dormant commerce
clause's nondiscrimination principle, rather than as evidence
that the principle itself is flawed. In contrast, when Congress
adopts legislation with which Professor Denning disagrees, he
cites such legislation, not as evidence of similar misapplication,
but rather as proof that Congress is inadequate to the task of
regulating interstate commerce. Why do the courts' mistakes
not similarly suggest that something is fundamentally amiss
with their decision making capacity?
Professor Denning also criticizes Congress for using the
Commerce Clause to grant "concentrated benefits to wellorganized interest groups" 38 and to focus upon "issue[s] of interest to a very broad group of states." 39 But this is how democracy
works. Legislators respond to organized interests and to salient
issues. In this respect, there is nothing special about Congress
acting under the Commerce Clause.
It is, moreover, these same "well-organized interest groups"
which bring the expensive and time consuming litigation claiming discrimination under the dormant commerce clause, e.g.,
regional stock exchanges, 40 ethanol producers, 41 tax-exempt
35

36
37

38

39
40
41

Denning, supra note 5, at 648-50.
Id. at 648-49.
Id. at 643.
Id. at 649.
Id.
Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988).
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bond investors. 42 If there is something untoward about the ability of these groups to obtain succor from Congress under the
Commerce Clause, there should also be something unsettling
about the demonstrated capacity of these groups to achieve
their goals in the courts.
At the end of the day, Congress is better positioned than
are the courts to provide the kind of ongoing, inherently political
supervision of interstate commerce and state taxation required
by an integrated modern economy.
CONCLUSION

Like a once-great champion who refuses to leave the ring,
the dormant commerce clause prohibition on discriminatory
taxation stumbles along well past its prime. In Professor
Denning, this time-honored prohibition has an energetic and
erudite defender. However, in the final analysis, the champ's
best days are in the past.
Whatever the historical value of the dormant commerce
clause principle of tax nondiscrimination, the principle today is
doctrinally incoherent. Any tax incentive can be converted into
an economically and procedurally equivalent direct spending
program. Moreover, no convincing border can be drawn between those tax provisions which are to be deemed discriminatory and those which are not. Consequently, today an arbitrary
subset of government policies and programs, i.e., certain illdefined tax provisions, are declared unconstitutionally discriminatory under the dormant commerce clause while other taxes
and direct spending programs pass Commerce Clause muster,
even though these other taxes and programs are procedurally
and economically equivalent to the taxes invalidated on constitutional grounds and, in protectionist fashion, benefit in-state
residents and actors just like the taxes stricken as discriminatory. Disputes over "discriminatory" taxation are best resolved
politically, in Congress and the state legislatures.

42 Davis v. Dep't of Revenue, 197 S.W.3d 557 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006), cert. granted, 127
S. Ct. 2451 (2007). See also, Zelinsky, Dauis, supra note 4, at 947.
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The constitutional precept of dormant commerce clause
nondiscrimination performed honorable and useful service to
the nation in tax cases. It is now time for the former champ to
lay down his gloves.

